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ABSTRACT 
Quantifying vulnerabilities of network systems has been a highly controversial issue in the fields of 
network security and IoT. Much research has been conducted on this purpose; however, these have many 
ambiguities and uncertainties. In this paper, we investigate the quantification of vulnerability in the 
Department of Transportation (DOT) as our proof of concept. We initiate the analysis of security 
requirements, using Security Quality Requirements Engineering (SQUARE) for security requirements 
elicitation. Then we apply published security standards such as NIST SP-800 and ISO 27001 to map our 
security factors and sub-factors. Finally, we propose our Multi-layered Fuzzy Logic (MFL) approach 
based on Goal question Metrics (GQM) to quantify network security and IoT (Mobile Devices) 
vulnerability in DOT. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Today we see drastic development and improvement of Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT). It is inevitable that many changes in computer networks result in security 
complications. Thus, when we analyze an organization’s network system we are required to 
consider its potential vulnerabilities for any unexpected attack or information leakage. many 
types of methodologies and procedures have been proposed using proper measurement 
approaches to tackle such vulnerabilities in an organization’s network system [1][2][3]. Mainly, 
these methodologies are divided into two categories: Qualitative and quantitative [4]. In the past 
[5] Multi-layered Fuzzy Logic has been used to quantify previously qualitative concepts. In this 
paper, we propose a Multi-layered Fuzzy Logic (MFL) approach to quantify potential 
vulnerabilities of the Department of Transportation (DOT). It comprises the computer network’s 
security and Mobile Devices as regards to IoT of DOT. For that, we have considered all aspects 
of DOT’s computer networks and Mobile Devices for security analysis. With a thorough 
security analysis to measure vulnerabilities, we have listed all security aspects of computer 
network and Mobile Devices as the security factors in a top-down manner from major to minor. 
Afterward, we evaluated all security factors to check if they overlap (in order to remove 
redundancy). Finally, we accepted Availability, Integrity, Accuracy, and Confidentiality for 
computer network vulnerability analysis, and Enterprise Mobile Management (EMM), User 
Access Control(UAC), and Encryption for Mobile Devices for consideration.  
We apply the Goal Question Metrics (GQM) [6] approach to provide the required input for the 
MFL approach. The input for MFL will be in the form of qualitative processes that are derived 
from the computer network and security expert evaluation in DOT based on standard security 
questions mapped to NIST SP800-53 and ISO 27001 standards. The entire procedure is 
addressed in section 3. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the background of the 
work to address the Fuzzy Logic in related work, computer network vulnerability 
quantification and IoT’s vulnerability measurement. Section 3 provides a description of 
our methodology in GQM, security standards, factors and sub-factors of network 
security and Mobile Devices. Section 4 addresses Multi-layered Fuzzy Logic (MFL) 
implementation. 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
2.1. Fuzzy Logic and Related Work 
Vulnerability measurement processes almost always result in a high degree of uncertainty. 
Because whenever we discuss the security of a network, we describe it as a linguistic variable 
form of ‘secure’, or ‘not secure’, that causes imprecision and vagueness. Therefore, we are not 
able to evaluate the accuracy of evaluation based on linguistic variables. In 1965, Lotfi Zadeh 
[7] at the University of California at Berkley proposed Fuzzy logic (and proved it 
mathematically). This method says that conventional computer logic is not able to work on data 
manipulation when the data carries the vagueness of human linguistic propensity. One of the 
advantages of the Fuzzy Logic methodology for vulnerability measurement is that the 
implementations based on mathematical models are reliable in all aspects of security analysis 
based on previous analysis of indication motors [8]. 
It is very important to know the degree of truth in Fuzzy Logic. Membership Function (MF) [9] 
is a pivotal component in Fuzzy Logic to provide such a degree of truth. It defines a function 
that specifies the degree of “belongingness” of an input to a set. The value of MF is always 
limited in the interval of [0-1]. The most common forms of MF are Triangular, Trapezoidal, 
piecewise Linear, Gaussian, and Singleton [10].  Figure 1 depicts an example of Triangular MF 
for temperature in a  sub-set of cold, cool, normal, warm and hot. 
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Figure 1.  Triangular MF for Temperature  
The triangular function is defined as follows: 
“ For a fuzzy set, A on the universe of discourse X is defined as µA:X → [0,1], where each 
element of X is in an area between 0 and 1 that quantifies the grade of membership of the 
element in X to the fuzzy set A. It is defined by a lower bound a and an upper bound b and the 
value m where a<m<b ” [7] (Table 1).  
Table 1.  Triangular Function Equation. 
μA (x)= 
0 If: x≤a 
(x-a)/(m-a) If: a<x≤m 
(b-x)/(x-m) If: m<x≤b 
0 If: x≥b 
 
A Fuzzy Logic system is a nonlinear mapping of the input data to a scalar output data and it has 
four major steps as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  Fuzzy Logic Steps  
Some authors have conducted research using the Mamdani model [13] of Fuzzy Inference to 
identify and measure potential threats and risks [14][15]. They applied this model to software to 
find out if the software modules are prone to attack or not. The main goal of their methodology 
was to eliminate training and testing phases while building up the procedure of software fault 
prediction using soft computing methods. 
Kamongi et al. [16]  proposed a method of ranking cloud system vulnerability and implemented 
it with vulnerability discovery on a cloud web application: the result was a list of ranked 
vulnerabilities associated with an attack path. They conceptualized cloud vulnerabilities as the 
attack paths from a pre-generated attack graph. Each path consists of information in regard to 
vulnerabilities of pre and post conditions that are required to be met for a successful security 
breach. 
Anikin et al. [17] proposed a quantitative information security risk assessment in computer 
networks. They applied Fuzzy Logic and analytic hierarchy processes to evaluate the impact and 
quantify the value of a specific threat. They presented the vulnerability risk assessment based on 
Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [18], but with the elimination of CVSS’ barriers to risk 
quantification. They suggested fuzzy if-then rules for decision support systems with discrete 
output that was obtained from decision making in oil production.  
Kuang et al. [19] conducted research on network security situation forecast using Fuzzy logic 
based on the Markov model. Their methodology is based on the combination of safe behavior 
historical data with the level of threats in the system. They analyzed branch prediction based on 
the Markov model and membership degree evaluation based on the Fuzzy system of information 
security vulnerabilities. Finally, they provided an integrated version of security situation 
prediction based on Fuzzy Logic. For verification, they used data from KDD CUP99’s data as 
training data and the DARPA2000’s data as testing data to obtain vulnerability information 
[20][21]. 
2.2. Internet of Thing (IoT) Vulnerability Assessment 
Internet of Things (IoT) is defined as the structure and combination of multiple devices that are 
connected to each other through the internet [22]. Interaction with and between IoT devices has 
changed over time. These changes can be due to either software or hardware variations. Such 
changes, which result in a loss of integrity,  are nowadays the major subject of security concerns 
in IoT. Lack of integrity in IoT causes a considerable cost for service providers and users 
because the adversary is able to take advantage of such security holes and cause irreparable 
harm. Millions of IP security cameras, doorbells, etc. are vulnerable to attack or can be hijacked 
to work against the devices’ owners. In organizations' security policies, the inherent risk of 
Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) made the IT departments to become more restrictive and 
required extensive monitoring of portable devices. Mobile Device Management (MDM) tools 
are also applied as security software to monitor and manage employees’ mobile devices. 
However, with all of these strict policies and monitoring, a wide variety of vulnerabilities still 
threatening organizations and put them into a serious risk of the data breach. Much research has 
been studied in this area as a major concern of today’s internet security. However, the problems 
in this area are not yet solved. 
Williams et al. [23] conducted research on vulnerability assessment of consumer IoT devices. 
They used Nessus [24] for vulnerability assessment since it has the capability of scanning many 
devices at a time. They scanned a large number of devices and extracted the result in a set such 
as ‘critical’, ‘high’, ‘medium’, and ‘low’ risks. They used Nessus for vulnerability assessment 
of IoT in different categories including devices of the home, workplace, and cities.  
Patton et al. [25] studied the vulnerable devices on the IoT and provided an evaluation of 
existing vulnerabilities in the IoT system. They applied Shodan, a search engine for IoT, that 
uses its database to maintain past scans. In the first step, they built an executed version of 
python scripts to utilize the Shodan API to interface with Shodan. Then they parsed device 
headers into MySQL database and used a password database; with a python script, they tested 
the password against IoT devices to capture vulnerabilities. They used the list of IP addresses 
collected from Shodan to scan thousands of devices to check if the default login credentials 
work. The result of vulnerabilities varied from %0.44 to %40. 
2.2.1. Mobile Devices 
Based on Gartner Research’s forecast [26] there will be 20.4 billion IoT devices by the end of 
2020 and almost 75 billion devices in 2025. With the expansion of the network systems in 
organizations, increasing the number of IoT devices due to the immense availability of 
connectivity devices is inevitable. This expectation of exponential proliferation is reasonable 
because enterprises make a large profit through the application of these ubiquitous mobile 
devices.  
On the other hand, IoT (including all mobile devices) put the enterprises at a high risk of being 
susceptible to attack through potential vulnerabilities. One of the most important parts of the 
cybersecurity domain is vulnerability measurements in Mobile Devices as a portable form of 
IoT in organizations such as DOT. There have been many arrangements for Mobile Devices 
policies and restrictions including building multiple layers of protection in agencies to keep 
their information safe from cyber-attacks. The more the employees in agencies use mobile 
devices the more the probability of cyber-attacks will emerge. The support layers to bolster the 
security of Mobile Devices consist of providing anti-malware software, secure mobile 
communications (using VPNs and requiring strong encryption and authentication), control of 
third-party’s software, performing penetration testing to check for vulnerabilities, auditing, etc. 
Nevertheless, a clear-cut quantification procedure to measure vulnerabilities of Mobile Devices 
has always been neglected, or at least, it has not been taken as seriously as possible. Thus, in 
this paper, we consider all aspects of Mobile Devices as part of IoT in DOT to provide a 
quantifiable measurement methodology for the potential vulnerabilities of a system. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Security Requirements 
Prior to the vulnerability measurement process of network security and Mobile Devices, we 
have to assure that our network design and implementation comply with standard security 
requirements as a pre-requisite of network design. One of the most important security flaws in 
organizations that leads them to be prone to cybersecurity attacks is the lack of a comprehensive 
and precise engineered design of security requirements [27]. It is implausible to design security 
requirements for a network system that guarantee no flaws, but still, organizations must take 
this step as a fundamental stage of attack prevention. The detection and correction phase of 
security requirements development costs 10 to 200 times less than the detection of flaws after 
system deployment in the field [27]. For security requirements elicitation there have been 
several proposed models such as Multilateral Security Requirements Analysis (MSRA) and 
Goal Base Requirements Analysis Record (GBRAM). In this paper, we apply the Security 
Quality Requirements Engineering (SQUARE) [28] for security requirements elicitation 
because it considers risk assessment and quality assurance simultaneously to maintain 
availability, integrity, and confidentiality of the security requirement goals. SQUARE is a 
process model developed at Carnegie Mellon  University to elicit, categorize and prioritize 
security requirements for IT departments and applications. 
In order to generate final deliverable prioritized security requirements in the system, SQUARE 
provides nine fundamental steps for security requirements elicitation. We adopted this model 
and extracted several major points to be highlighted as fundamental security requirements in 
DOT. These steps are Integrity, Physical Security, Authentication, Access Control, Availability, 
Audition, and Authorization. Therefore, the very first step of vulnerability measurement in DOT 
is following these security requirement elicitation processes to design all components of 
security in the system for network security and Mobile Devices (IoT). 
3.2. Goal Question Metrics 
Goal Question Metrics (GQM) is an approach for developing a model based on the goals of the 
project. This model was originally developed by Basili [29] at the University of Maryland to 
measure software quality. The metric measurement model is proposed in three steps: conceptual 
model (Goal), operational model (Question) and quantitative model (Metrics) [30]. One good 
aspect of this model’s application is that there may be many goals and consequently multiple 
times questions for a project, but the rate of metrics does not grow at the same rate as goals or 
questions. These three steps are decomposed to six steps in detail for metric measurements in 
the software product as follows: 
1. Develop project goals. 
2. Generate questions that describe the goals in step 1. 
3. Define the specific measures to answer the questions designed in step 2. 
4. Data collection mechanisms. 
5. Validate and analyze data that are obtained in step 4. 
6. Data analysis to assess the conformance of the goals. 
Based on the analysis and consideration of security requirements using SQUARE model for 
network security and Mobile Devices in DOT we design questions accordingly for each security 
factor in a top-down manner to reach the desired goal (vulnerability quantification). The main 
reason for using GQM in our research is that it is a de facto standard for quality metrics in 
software engineering and is therefore widely accepted and respected [29]. Our use of GQM is 
analogous to how it has been previously used in software metrics. Based on the security 
requirements of DOT we designed the goals (numerical vulnerability value of each security 
factor) that are traceable to a set of quantifiable questions [31]. In our previous research [32], we 
introduced a hierarchy model to identify the security requirements of organizations using GQM 
to be a primary work of vulnerability measurement that enable us to trace from security 
requirements to security metrics. 
3.3. Security Standards 
After identifying the security requirements and determining security goals and questions based 
on GQM to measure vulnerability, we map every possible security question derived from 
essential factors of network security and Mobile Devices to the currently published security 
standards from NIST SP800-53 and ISO 27001. Passing through this process is to make sure 
that we are following all the available security standards. 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 [33] is an international standard to specify an information security 
management system (ISMS). This standard helps organizations focus on three key aspects of 
information: confidentiality, integrity, and availability. It examines the organization’s risk, 
threat and potential vulnerabilities, provides all information security controls in order to 
reinforce strategies for risk avoidance, and finally, it makes sure that all security management 
processes and security controls meet the organizations’ security needs.  
Another purpose of this standard is to verify the proper selection of proportionate security 
controls to provide an acceptable amount of protection for assets. In sum, its main features are 
information security policies, communication, and operational management, access control, 
information system acquisition, organization of information security, asset management, 
business continuity management, human resources security and physical security [34]. 
NIST SP800-53 [35] is a publication of the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(US) that specifies a set consisting of 198 security controls. Controls are categorized into three 
main groups: technical, operational and management. These three groups can characterize 
several subgroups such as access control, awareness and training, audit and accountability, 
security assessment and authorization, configuration management, contingency planning, 
identification and authorization, system and information integrity, etc. 
 
3.4. Security Factors and Sub-factors in DOT 
While analyzing the main components of network security and Mobile Devices (as part of IoT) 
in DOT, we designed each security component as security factors and sub-factors at each level. 
Table 2 and Table 3 describe each security factor and sub-factor based on the published security 
standards of NIST SP800-53 and ISO 27001. 
Table 2.  Network Security Factors and Sub-factors in DOT. 
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Table 3. Mobile Devices’ Security Factors and Sub-factors in DOT. 
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Since our goal in this research is to quantify vulnerabilities in DOT from the perspective of 
network security and IOT, we designed relevant security questions to map all security factors 
and sub-factors mentioned in Table 2 and Table 3 based on the GQM model. The questionnaire 
is designed in a top-down manner to assign one or more question(s) for vulnerability 
measurement depending on the type of questions. The questionnaire will be answered by the 
computer network and security experts of DOT. A few numbers of questions are chosen from 
the questionnaire and are listed in Table 4.  
Table 4. Security Questions derived from GQM mapped to Security Standards 
Security Factor Question 
Availability Does DOT make sure security mechanisms and redundancies are 
implemented to protect equipment from utility service outages (e.g., power 
failures, network disruptions, etc.) 
Integrity How often does DOT ensure that data does not migrate beyond a defined 
geographical residency? 
Accuracy How often does your organization consider annual review including third 
party providers upon which their information supply chain depends? 
Confidentiality Does your agency require two-factor authentication for remote access? (e.g. 
token is used in addition to a username, and password). 
Enterprise 
Mobility 
Management 
How often does your agency require/remind employees to report their mobile 
devices’ lost or stolen? 
User Access 
Control (UAC) 
Does your organization require and enforce via technical controls an 
automatic lockout screen for mobile devices or any company-owned devices? 
Encryption How often does your organization’s mobile device policy require the use of 
encryption for either the entire device or for data identified as sensitive 
enforceable through technology controls for all mobile devices? 
3.5. Multi-Layered Fuzzy Logic 
The main reason for using Fuzzy Logic is that it is one of the most reliable mathematical tools 
to model problems that have the most inaccuracy and uncertainty [7]. Another crucial reason for 
using Fuzzy Logic in this research is that we are dealing with linguistic variables to qualitatively 
determine the value of the security as ‘good’ or ‘bad’. As we described the Triangular Fuzzy 
model MF in section 2, we will apply it for vulnerability quantification because it provides a 
simple Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) that correlates the vulnerability attributes quantitatively in 
fuzzification processes. We use the most common properties of fuzzy logic for Afuzzy and Bfuzzy 
as follows: 
μA∪B (x)=min[μA (x),μB (x)] | x∈X   ,      μA∩B (x)=max[μA (x),μB (x)] | x∈X  
In the Defuzzification process, this model generates a crisp number derived from the fuzzy set. 
There are several Defuzzification methods such as Center of Area (COA), Bisector of Area 
(BOA), largest of Maximum (LOM), Mean of Maximum (MOM), Smallest of Maximum, etc 
[36]. We use the COA method [37] since this method considers, determines the center of the 
area of fuzzy set and returns the corresponding crisp value of that [38][12]. 
To measure the vulnerability of the network system and Mobile Devices in DOT, we follow a 
few important steps from the analysis part in the cybersecurity domain to the final step of 
measurement. Figure 3 depicts the order of the processes. 
 
Figure 3.  vulnerability Measurement Steps in DOT  
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Figure 4.  MFL for Network Security and Mobile Devices (IoT) in DOT 
As it shows in Figure 4 we define a Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) process separately for each 
security factor in a backward flow from sub-score (leaves) to the main factors (nodes). In the 
next phase, the results of the first-step-FIS are being processed cumulatively in the second-step-
FIS. The result is a crisp value to measure vulnerabilities of the factors based on the FIS rules 
that are defined for linguistic variables. The main steps to determine the parameters of FIS are 
the MF calculation mechanism of linguistic values to maintain them in a database for both 
antecedent(if)and consequent(then), plus the Fuzzy reasoning mechanism from the 
number of used Fuzzy rules [39]. 
When security experts in the DOT answer the questionnaire for each sub-factor, the answers 
will be categorized to appropriate security Groups based on the role of each sub-factor in 
network security, and Mobile Devices. The reason for this classification is that the answers are 
in the format of fuzzy subsets such as ‘very low’, ‘low’, ‘medium’, ‘high’ and ‘very high’. The 
weights from 0 to 10 are assigned to each sub-factor in the questionnaire to determine what 
fuzzy subset each sub-factor belongs to. In this case, the factor Enterprise Mobility Management 
(EMM) is the result of the combination of all sub-factors in Group 1 (Mobile Device 
Management System (MDM)) and Group 2 (Mobile Application Management System (MAM)). 
To achieve MDM and MAM we apply FIS accordingly based on their own sub-groups derived 
from Table 3. As shown in Figure 5 the interior FIS layers of MDM are generated from security 
questions, lost or stolen reports, jailbreaking prevention, automatic lockout and inventory of 
mobile devices. After obtaining all required crisp values from MFL, we measure the final value 
of vulnerability from the aggregation of the previous values. 
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Figure 5.  Fuzzy Subset implementation for EMM based on interior FIS. 
In order to convert the expert answers of the questions from the form of linguistic values to the 
form of Fuzzy subset, we need to define the concepts of the values ‘very low’, ‘low’, ‘medium’, 
‘high’ and ‘very high’ for each question. Since the implementation and the full discussion of all 
components of network security and Mobile Devices are beyond the scope of this paper we 
show only the implementation of Mobile Devices (IoT) in DOT. Table 5 addresses these 
definitions based on the answers to each question in Mobile Devices’ factors and sub-factors. 
Table 5. Description of Weighted Questions to convert to Fuzzy Subsets 
Sub-factors Description in Fuzzy sets 
Security 
Questions 
Very 
low 
DOT never asks security questions or challenges to their employees to prevent 
unwanted access to Mobile Devices. 
Low 
DOT sometimes asks security questions to their employees to prevent unwanted 
access to Mobile Devices. 
Medium 
DOT regularly provides mechanisms to prevent unwanted access to Mobile 
Devices. 
High 
DOT usually provides mechanisms to prevent unwanted access to Mobile 
Devices. 
Very 
High 
DOT always asks extra security questions and challenges to their employees 
coupled with providing mechanisms to prevent unwanted access to Mobile 
Devices. 
Lost or 
Stolen 
Reports 
Very 
Low 
DOT never requires their employees to report if their Mobile Devices are lost or 
stolen. 
Low 
DOT rarely requires their employees to report if their Mobile Devices are lost or 
stolen. 
Medium 
DOT regularly requires their employees to report if their Mobile Devices are lost 
or stolen. 
High 
DOT usually requires their employees to report if their Mobile Devices are lost 
or stolen, if so, they usually have a security plan for data protection of such 
devices. 
Very 
High 
DOT always requires their employees to report if their Mobile Devices are lost 
or stolen, if so, they always have a strong security plan for data protection of 
such devices. 
Inventory of 
Mobile 
Devices 
Very 
Low 
DOT never maintains an inventory of all Mobile Devices. 
Low DOT sometimes maintains an inventory of all Mobile Devices. 
Medium DOT regularly maintains an inventory of all Mobile Devices. 
High 
DOT usually maintains an inventory of all Mobile Devices storing and accessing 
company data which includes the status of OS, patch level, lost, decommissioned 
and device assignee. 
Very 
High 
DOT always maintains an inventory of all Mobile Devices storing and accessing 
company data which includes the status of OS, patch level, lost, decommissioned 
and device assignee. 
Automatic 
Lockout 
Screen 
Very 
Low 
DOT does not have any plan for Mobile Devices’ automatic lockout screen. 
Low 
It is not DOT’s priority to have an automatic lockout screen plan for Mobile 
Devices. 
Medium 
It is important for DOT to have an automatic Lockout Screen plan for Mobile 
Devices but they are not very strict on that. 
High 
DOT’s Mobile Devices policies usually prohibit the circumvention of built-in 
security controls on mobile devices such as jailbreaking or rooting but they are 
not very strict on that. 
Very 
High 
DOT’s Mobile Devices policies always prohibit the circumvention of built-in 
security controls on mobile devices such as jailbreaking or rooting. 
MAM 
Very 
low 
DOT does not provide any Mobile Application Management (MAM) plan for 
Mobile Devices’ security. 
Low 
DOT sometimes performs a Mobile Application Management (MAM) plan for 
Mobile Devices’ security. 
Medium 
It is not a priority for DOT to perform Mobile Application Management (MAM) 
for mobile devices’ security maintenance, but it is part of their security plan. 
High DOT usually performs Mobile Application Management (MAM) to maintain the 
security of Mobile Devices. 
Very 
High 
DOT always performs or implements Mobile Application Management (MAM) 
to maintain the security of Mobile Devices and manages all changes to the 
devices’ OS. 
Remote Data 
Wipe 
Very 
Low 
DOT’s IT department never has a plan for remote data wipe for Mobile Devices. 
Low DOT’s IT department rarely provides remote data wipe or corporate data wipe 
for Mobile Devices. 
Medium DOT’s IT department regularly provides remote data wipe or corporate data 
wipe for Mobile Devices. 
High DOT’s IT department usually provides remote wipe or corporate data wipe for 
Mobile Devices. 
Very 
High 
DOT’s IT department always provides remote wipe or corporate data wipe for all 
company-accepted BYOD devices or any mobile devices 
Monitoring 
Very 
Low 
DOT does not have any controls on unauthorized software installation. 
Low DOT rarely controls unauthorized software installation. 
Medium DOT has a regular plan for unauthorized software installation, but not strictly. 
High DOT usually has controls in place to restrict and monitor the installation of 
unauthorized software onto the Mobile Devices. 
Very 
High 
DOT always has controls in place to restrict and monitor the installation of 
unauthorized software onto the Mobile Devices. 
User name 
and Password 
Very 
Low 
DOT never asks employees to change the username and password of their 
Mobile Devices. 
Low DOT sometimes asks employees to change the username and password of their 
Mobile Devices but they are not required. 
Medium DOT regularly requires employees to change the username and password of their 
Mobile Devices. 
High DOT usually requires employees to change the username and password of their 
Mobile Devices. 
Very 
High 
DOT always strictly requires employees to change the username and password of 
their Mobile Devices. 
 
4. IMPLEMENTATION 
As we mentioned in section 3.5 we implement only the Mobile Devices’ factors and sub-
factors as part of the MFL approach. Figure 6 shows the procedure of Mamdani FIS for Lost 
Devices Policies. Based on the MF derived from Group 1 and Group 2 we obtain the result 
of the output variable ‘LostDevices’ that is a sub-factor of MDM in a Triangular MF format. 
Figure 7 represents the MF plot for predefined Fuzzy sets in Group 1 that is limited in the 
range of 0 to 10 and determines each sub-factor’s value derived from the security question. 
The value10 indicates the highest security for the ‘LostDevices’ subfactor in Mobile Devices 
and 0 indicates the lowest one in DOT’s network system. 
 
 
Figure 6.  FIS for LostDevices. 
 Figure 7.  Fuzzy Subset and MF for Group 1. 
In the FIS system, before the inference operations, the rules should be defined for the Fuzzy 
output variable. Thus, we apply if-then rules to map the input to the output. The main 
advantage of if-then rules is that they are evaluated in parallel, therefore, the order of rules 
does not matter. As we mentioned before, these rules are defined based on the expert’s answers 
in the questionnaire that was derived from the DOT’s network system. Thus, we define all terms 
we plan to use in the rules that interpret the values in the input vector and support to assign the 
appropriate values to the output vector. It is used for a combination of attributes based on the 
linguistic declaration. 
Fuzzy rules are assigned to each group of subsets to provide a functional relationship between 
Fuzzy attributes. As shown in Figure 8 we defined 25 rules for each group in the Centroid 
(COA) model. The total number of rules depends on the number of subsets. In this case, we 
have two groups and each group has 5 subsets that result in 25 rules. All rules are assigned to 
the same weight 1, presented at the end of the line for each rule, however, they can be varied in 
the interval of [0,1]. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Fuzzy Rules for LostDevices. 
Each of the above if-then rules generates an output in the form of a Fuzzy set. To make a 
decision based on a single Fuzzy set, we need to apply the aggregation method (Figure 9) to 
combine all Fuzzy sets from if-then rules to a single Fuzzy set. The last plot in Figure 9 
represents the aggregation of all combined Fuzzy sets. In this paper, we use the max-min 
technique for aggregation and the final value is achieved by the following equation: 
Final Value= max(Group1, Group2,…, GroupN) 
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µ
AND     …      AND THEN MIN
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Aggregation max-min
0
1 1 1
0 0
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0
1 1 1
0 0
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1
1
0  
Figure 9.  Aggregation in Fuzzy Sets. 
 
 
Figure 10.  Output Curve for LostDevices. 
The three-dimensional curve in Figure 10 depicts the mapping from Group1 and Group 2 to 
LostDevices. The vertical axis LostDevices represents the range of 0 to 9 that 0 indicates the 
least security arrangement (maximum vulnerability) for Mobile Devices and 9 indicates the 
maximum security plan (minimum vulnerability). 
 
Fuzzy Inference processes are presented in Figure 11. It helps us to adjust the input values and 
obtain the corresponding aggregated output value for each Fuzzy rule. The first two columns of 
the plot depict the MF referenced by if-part of each rule. This part is called the antecedent and 
the last column indicates the MF referenced by then-part of each rule which is called the 
consequent. The average value for inputs and output is displayed on top of each column. Group 
1 has an average value of 6.2 and Group 2 has an average value of 7.97 out of 10. The last 
column displays for LostDevice the result value 6.5 out of 10 (characterized by the last plot of 
the third column at the very right bottom) that indicates the weighted decision of the inference 
system based on the aggregation that depends on the input values. The value 6.5 indicates the 
security of that parameter in Mobile Devices. Therefore, the vulnerability of that is achieved by 
10-6.5= 3.5 up to this point. 
 
Figure 11.  Fuzzy Inference Processes for LostDevices. 
In order to achieve the vulnerability of the sub-factor Mobile Device Management System 
(MDM) as part of the factor Mobile Devices, we need to aggregate the output of the previous 
step’s Fuzzy layer with the output of FIS for Group 3 and 4 in the next layer (Figure 5). As it 
displays in Figure 12 the output value for this Fuzzy layer is 4.58. Therefore, the output of these 
two layers is (6.5+4.58)/2=5.54 which represents the security level of Mobile Devices at this 
point. As a result, the vulnerability value for MDM is 4.46. This process will be continued until 
we obtain the final value for Mobile Devices as part of IoT in DOT. 
 
 
 
Figure 12.  Fuzzy Inference Processes for Group 3 and 4. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
As always network security experts describe the quality of security of a network in a human 
linguistic manner such as ‘good’ or ‘relatively good’, there would be a variety of interpretations 
for such description. Thus, our MFL methodology can evaluate quantitative vulnerability values 
using the Fuzzy Inference System. The findings of this study can be understood as a precise 
methodology of vulnerability analysis of network security, IoT, etc. in organizations. To our 
knowledge, this the first report of quantifying vulnerability based on security standards, GQM 
and without relying on other vulnerability measurement software such as CVSS and Nessus. 
Broadly translated our findings indicate that this approach can be applied not only in DOT but 
any agency that wants to measure the vulnerability of their network system quantitatively. 
The future work of this research will be sending the questionnaire to the network security 
experts of DOT and measure the vulnerability of all security aspects of DOT such as physical 
security, Web Applications, Audit, etc. Moreover, future investigations are necessary to validate 
the kinds of conclusions that can be drawn from this study. 
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